Weekly Update (June 2nd to June 8th)

I’ve spent most of this week working on my defence (such as it is) of Stevenson. Part of that defence rests on a rough distinction that I think we can draw between styles of reasoning about ethics, or a way that we might categorise metaethical theories. After I drafted an initial essay, I realised that this distinction is a surprisingly large aspect of the defence, so I have been spending time trying to nail down and substantiate that distinction. I’m not sure that it’s an argument that will convince anyone else (yet), but I have been personally happy with the way that the argument is developing and think that there is something to the idea. It also amuses me that I’m suggesting that we need a metametaethics.

As I work away at this, I have been starting to read up on incommensurability in ethics. These issues have obvious connections to my primary interests. Disagreement plays a huge role in the generation of metaethical thinkers that I am interested in, and some of the work on incommensurability, etc. helps to formalise and reason about some of the intuitions that they relied upon. It doesn’t always favour them! Some of the arguments raised in the discussion around incommensurability remind me of arguments that Michele Moody-Adams, et al. make about the role interpretation plays in ethics. Not having a single, agreed-upon measure doesn’t mean that we can’t make decisions between incomparable options, or understand the decisions that other people make in situations where they need to make those choices. Moody-Adams also suggests that agreement mightn’t need to mean “being compelled to think the same thing”, and there’s real substance in that view.

These concerns do manage to feed into broader issues in moral psychology, interpretation manages to operate as a really handy bridge. Nancy Snow in Virtue as Social Intelligence, for example, criticises philosophers who want to eliminate talk of character (and hence virtue) from our ethical talk and who lean on work in social psychology that emphasises the role situations play in determining action. Her criticism relies on the possibility of offering a substantial characterisation of personality that relates it to the way we interpret situations; she argues that it’s interpretation that gives situation its causal power. We might also be able to productively relate this to some of Nussbaum’s work on emotion, I think that the eudaimonistic judgements that she sees as consitutive parts of emotion could be put into conversation with broader moral psychology in this way.

One interesting question for me is whether Stevenson can be usefully discussed alongside all this. I think that people would typically say ‘no’ here, but he never really gives us a full-account of emotions/attitudes. In a lot of ways he remains neutral on these questions. There is an implicit theory of emotions/psychology in emotivism, and it’s maybe closer to these interpretative accounts than people have tended to assume.

I’m still reading up on Australian history and have decided to make my way through the two-volume Cambridge History. Part of me is doing this a little sadly. My grandmother was a history teacher, and remained interested in the country’s history after she retired. I wish that I had become interested in the history of this country a few years ago, so that I could have spoken to her about it. It makes me feel closer to her, but it’s still slightly bittersweet.

About

A blog of hardly edited, developing thoughts that I’m putting online, in the hope that I can reason about them with the help of others. Feel free to email hastythoughts @ proton.me with any criticism or commentary. I’d love to talk about whatever’s on your mind with you.

Articles, etc. worth reading

A small list of essays, short stories, and poems that I have read, and found worthwhile, recently. Please take 'worthwhile' to be a fairly broad evaluation.

The Wrong Durée - The Politics of Cedric J. Robinson’s Racial Capitalism

We can distinguish mere hobbies and idiosyncratic preferences from deeper political and social commitments, those activities and ideas that inform daily life and, in certain moments, that compel us to transform the terms of everyday life by amassing social power through alliance with others; donations of time, money, and resources; acts of solidarity; sabotage; strikes; occupation; activist campaigns; party formation; voting; lobbying; social movements; protests; rebellion; and war. Political interests are essentially what particular constituencies want both in an immediate sense of metabolic needs, political rights, social relations, resources, and other conditions of life and the conscious ideological sense, what kind of world those constituents want. The fact of social heterogeneity, diverse passions, rivalries, and conflicting interests is a fundamental condition of our species and the plane where politics begins

Cedric Johnson, nonsite | Read more
‘War has made me a pacifist’. Why are we so reluctant to acknowledge Australia’s anti-war veterans?

Why has Australia been so hostile toward soldiers and veterans who draw on their service to challenge war? The role of war history in Australian identity has played a part. Historian Peter Stanley argues “Australia as a nation has been notably bellicose”, to the point “even the idea of ‘peace’ has not been a major part of its history”. Australian norms of masculinity, drawn from the image of the larrikin digger, emphasise stoicism and an easygoing nature. These traits do not sit comfortably with anti-war complaint.

Mia Martin Hobbs, The Conversation | Read more
The Most Dangerous Game

Ilya’s Magic strategy consisted of stealing rares from his ten-year-old cousin, who was the only person he ever played with besides me. Soon, I started to beat him easily with my control deck. His parents didn’t seem to mind that he spent all day in his room playing video games, rather than improving himself—maybe that was why he was not as motivated as I was to get good at Magic. For my part, I developed an elaborate fantasy of myself as a tournament-level player, even though I still never joined any tournaments or played against anyone besides Ilya. Ilya thought I tried too hard and was scared of my mom.

Anton Solomonik, Evergreen Review | Read more
The Right Against the Rule of Law

By setting themselves against such legal structures, Berman argued, governments are able to position themselves as bold, resolute and courageous. As he noted in relation to Iraq, the Bush administration used such language to contrast itself to the conservative and timid structures of the international legal order. This enabled Bush to argue that – in invading Iraq – it was the US itself that embodied justice, as against recalcitrant international legal structures. Such behaviour is always a particular choice. Given the indeterminacy of (international) law, it will always be possible for state personnel to find some legal arguments with which to justify their behaviour. Even those states most condemned by the ‘international community’ tend to respond not by acknowledging the breach, or by impugning the institution, but rather by legally supporting their conduct. The turn to legitimacy by defiance therefore is always a political choice, as opposed to a response to a lack of availability of arguments, or a weak legal hand.

Rob Knox, Salvage | Read more
The Trickle Down Theory of Schooling

But teachers are not like medical practitioners and students are not like patients. Teachers try to enlist students in their cause; students might or might not join in. They might do their best to make sense of what the teachers seems to want, or pretend that they’re trying to, or subvert or resist the teacher’s efforts in myriad ways. Much of what students learn is not what is taught but what students think has been taught; often it has not been taught at all, for students learn all kinds of other things in the classroom and everywhere else at school. They learn about themselves, the world, how the world treats them, and how they can and should treat others. Students are, in other words, co-producers of learning, of themselves, and of each other. They learn, and they grow.

Dean Ashden, Inside Story | Read more
Just Another Liberalism

Foucault characterizes liberalism by a few fundamental nonideological features, chiefly affective in nature. This sort of analysis may appear disturbingly nonempirical or arbitrary for those accustomed to definitions of liberalism as a political regime or system of belief (or even as a “way of life” or ethics) rather than as a set of feelings. It has, nevertheless, a pedigree in the history of liberal thought. In The Spirit of Laws, the eighteenth-century French political philosopher Montesquieu revised Aristotle’s account of the differences among various forms of government to emphasize that despotic, monarchical, and republican states depend on and engender various emotional climates. Their political cultures, and the characters of their citizens, vary insofar as different affective mechanisms (e.g., fear, honor, virtue) circulate among rulers and ruled as the primary motivators of action. Montesquieu argued that despotism, the unlimited rule of a single tyrant, was a political form in which fear predominates. Foucault, however, complicates Montesquieu’s analysis by arguing that liberalism—which emerged in no small part out of Montesquieu’s critiques of despotism—is itself driven by a particular kind of fear, as well as concomitant or counterbalancing hopes.

Blake Smith, The Hedgehog Review | Read more
Family vloggers, kidfluencers, and the commodification of childhood

While it mightn’t be the first impulse of most parents of funny, charismatic children to upload their lives to YouTube, Brooke and Justin Norris are not alone. Social media “kidfluencing”, which encompasses family vlogging and related practices, is a multi-billion-dollar industry. For the right families, it can be lucrative. After YouTube takes its cut, creators earn an estimated $15 to $45 AUD in ad revenue for every thousand views. The Norrises’ vlogs have amassed over two billion views, and the Bondi-based family is now worth over $30 million AUD. Long-time viewers have been privy to the unveiling of dream houses, apartments, and cars, and accompanied the Norrises on numerous holidays. Formerly the family’s sole breadwinner, Justin sold his business in 2020, the same year the channel reached five million subscribers. The sale marked a shift to complete financial dependence on the Norris Nuts brand — that is, on the children.

Isabel Prior, Overland Journal | Read more